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MODELING CONTINGENCY MANAGEMENT IN UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
Emily Barrett and Martijn IJtsma
The Ohio State University
Columbus, OH
Contingency management in future Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) Traffic
Management (UTM) requires a variety of distributed and interdependent
functions and services—such as flight tracking and conformance monitoring,
weather detection and prediction, and ground-based detection and avoidance—
that need to be coordinated across multiple roles and organizations. This paper
describes a combination of cognitive walkthroughs and computational modeling
of work to analyze edge case scenarios and assess resiliency in future UTM
operations. We discuss how the walkthrough and modeling inform each other and
present early results. The ultimate goal of this work is to identify requirements for
robust and resilient system responses in future UTM contingency management.
Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) is an envisioned concept of
operation for lower-altitude airspaces with a mix of unmanned and manned capabilities (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 2019). UTM operations rely on effective
information sharing and coordination among a number of interdependent roles and organizations,
including and facilitated by automated services. To assure efficiency and safety of the
operations, the system needs to be robust and resilient against anticipated and unanticipated
contingencies.
This paper discusses early work on exploring robustness and resilience in contingency
management (CM) in UTM operations. We conducted several cognitive walkthroughs and
developed a computational model of CM operations for a variety of edge case scenarios. The
approach demonstrates how cognitive walkthroughs and computational work modeling can
inform each other and provide early results from a computational experiment testing two
different types of CM automation.
Background
Figure 1 shows a notional architecture for the UTM system (see NASA, 2019 for a
detailed description of the architecture). Actors in the system include Remote Pilots in Command
(RPIC), UAS Service Suppliers (USS) and/or Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSS). At
the heart of the system is the UTM Operations Center, tasked with supervising the UTM system
and managing the airspace. Information sharing is handled through an Unmanned Traffic
Information Management System. The UTM system also interfaces with Air Traffic Control
(ATC) in the area via the Flight Information Management System (FIMS).
Robustness and resilience describe a system’s ability to adapt and maintain performance
under anticipated and unanticipated disruptions, respectively. Resilient CM requires fast-paced
responses with interaction and coordination across various roles, see the example procedural
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information flows in Figure 1. Earlier research on coordination and adaptation for resilient
behavior used edge case scenarios and cognitive walkthroughs with subject-matter experts
(SMEs) to assess the system’s response at the boundary of performance envelopes (Bisantz &
Roth, 2007; Woods & Balkin, 2018).
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Figure 1. Information Flow Diagram for Component Failure Contingency
Modeling of cognitive work can support assessment of robustness and resilience. Work in
complex work domains like UTM is driven by constraints and dynamics in the work
environment that can be identified and codified (Vicente, 1999). Once codified, models can be
simulated to evaluate the dynamics of such work (Pritchett, Bhattacharyya, & IJtsma, 2016;
Pritchett, Feigh, Kim, & Kannan, 2014). We argue that for assessing resilience in future UTM
operations, knowledge-elicitation and modeling can be part of a formative and iterative cycle in
which exploration of system characteristics and responses support identification of design
requirements, similar to Vicente (1999) and Woods & Roth (1994). In this paper, we combine
cognitive walkthroughs and computational modeling and simulation of edge case scenarios to
perform model-based exploration of a UTM system’s robustness and resilience.
Edge Case Scenarios & Cognitive Walkthroughs
We conducted cognitive walkthroughs with SMEs to explore how actors in future UTM
operations would need to respond and coordinate during CM. A document review was conducted
to learn about the envisioned UTM system at hand, including the various types of contingencies
that could take place and disrupt the nominal flow of operation. Five classes of contingencies
were created that span a range of disruptions to the system’s nominal operations, see Table 1.
For each of these classes, we developed narratives with a representative traffic situation
and a set of probing questions for the SMEs. The probing questions were targeted at discovering
how actors, as part of the bigger UTM system, would adapt and coordinate to respond to
disruptions and at testing the validity of the scenarios and envisioned procedures. All
interviewees were subject matter experts in the field of aviation who have experience in UAV
operations, air traffic management, and/or resilience engineering.
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Table 1.
Contingency classes and descriptions
Contingency
Component failure
Loss of link
Weather event
External emergency
Unidentified actor

Description
Failure of a component or system critical to the operations (e.g., radar, ping station)
UTM is not receiving telemetry data and/or cannot communicate with a UAV
Weather front moves through area, and/or micro-weather conditions deteriorate
An external event (e.g., fire, police activity) requires unanticipated airspace changes
UAV is not conforming to the expected flight plan or uncontrollable moving objects

As an example of an edge case scenario, the component failure narrative involved two
RPICs, pilots of a commercial flight, one UTM Supervisor, and one USS. The traffic situation
consisted of three vehicles flying west of Columbus, Ohio: a high priority UAV flight
transporting a liver transplant, a law enforcement UAV surveying a crime scene, and a
commercial airline flight landing at the John Glenn Columbus International Airport (CMH).
When the traffic is nearing closest-points-of-approach, a radar fails unexpectedly, resulting in a
loss of sensing capability for the UTM system and a need for to reconfigure the airspace.
The walkthroughs revealed various complicating factors to CM, such as constraints, goal
conflicts, time pressures, and the need to coordination between actors, particularly between the
RPICs and UTM supervisor. For example, interviewees noted trade-offs between closing the
airspace for all current traffic (requiring rerouting) or allowing existing flights to continue, with
the ability to monitor the separation as a determining factor. The findings from the document
review and walkthroughs were aggregated into an abstraction hierarchy for the overall UTM
system (Vicente, 1999), see Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Abstraction hierarchy for a UTM system.
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Work Models that Compute
In parallel with the walkthroughs, we developed a computational model of the work
involved in UTM CM. Work Models that Compute (WMC) is a computational modeling and
simulation framework for analyzing situated work (Pritchett et al., 2014), used before to analyze
work allocation in air traffic management and space operations. Through models of resources,
actions, and agents, WMC can make quantitative predictions of system performance given
different system configurations.
The first two columns of Table 2 show the actions that were modeled in WMC for what
were deemed the purpose-related functions most critical to CM, see the highlighting in Figure 2.
Furthermore, the flight dynamics of the aircraft are deemed an important driver of the UTM
system’s dynamics, determining much of the actors’ timing of activity to keep pace with
disturbances. Thus, the computational work model includes a model of the flight dynamics for a
generic UAV, with parameters that can be changed to simulate a variety of vehicle classes (e.g.,
a small quadrotor UAV or a large package delivery drone).
Results from the cognitive walkthroughs directly informed the modeling, with the
system’s response captured primarily in the first three and last rows of Table 2. The work model
also includes descriptions of the information resources (such as geographic location, altitude, and
radar status) that are shared amongst the actors. As an example of how the walkthrough informed
the modeling, several SMEs noted their decisions about the impact of the radar failure depended
on the vertical separation between aircraft. Thus, the “assess impact” action is modeled to
compare the difference in altitudes of the two vehicles, then assigning High, Medium, or Low to
the Impact resource that is shared with the other actors in the system.
Table 2.
Work model actions with two allocations of authority (A) and responsibility (R) (format: A/R)
Purpose-Related Function
Airspace Allocation and
Constraint Definition

Work Model Action(s)

Allocation 1

Allocation 2

Generate UVR

Supervisor/Supervisor

Automation/Supervisor

UAS System monitoring

Assess impact, monitor system
integrity

Supervisor/Supervisor

Automation/Supervisor

Operation Intent Sharing

Communicate via NOTAM

Supervisor/Supervisor

Automation/Supervisor

Flight Tracking and
Conformance Monitoring

Track flight, manage waypoint
progress
Change altitude, change speed,
change heading, takeoff, land,
direct to waypoint, distance to
next waypoint, flight dynamics

RPIC/RPIC

RPIC/RPIC

UAV/RPIC

UAV/RPIC

Avoid conflict, detect conflict

RPIC/RPIC

RPIC/RPIC

Reroute flight

RPIC/Supervisor

Automation/Supervisor

Control of Flight
Aircraft and Obstacle
Avoidance
Dynamic Rerouting

A WMC run simulates the detailed interaction between actions and the work environment
(as captured in resources), including how activity of actors in the system is interconnected
through dynamics and information. WMC provides quantitative data on the dynamics of activity,
such how often and when actions are performed, and how often and what information is shared
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amongst actors. In addition, WMC can be used to evaluate effect of system design choices, such
as the allocation of authority and responsibility between human operators and various
autonomous capabilities. Here, authority denotes the agent that will be executing an action, and
responsibility denotes who is held accountable for the outcome of an action.
To demonstrate, we conducted simulation runs with two types of automated capabilities,
see the last two columns of Table 2: Allocation 1 with a UTM supervisor performing the
majority of the work manually, and Allocation 2 in which a majority of the CM is automated,
with the UTM supervisor monitoring the automated response. In the latter case, the UTM
supervisor is still responsible for the outcome. In these instances of mismatching authority and
responsibility, WMC automatically engenders a monitoring action for the authorized agent (i.e.,
UTM supervisor), executed in parallel with the automation’s actions (Pritchett et al., 2016).
Figure 3 and 4 show early results from simulation runs. Figure 3 illustrates when each
actor is performing an action. Because actions related to control of flight (executed by the UAV)
are updated relatively frequently, and the CM actions are of primary concern to this analysis,
these actions are omitted from the figure. The figure shows when human actors need to monitor
automation agents due to authority-responsibility mismatches (shown as ‘teamwork’), clearly
indicating that more autonomous capabilities lead to higher monitoring loads. Time pressure was
an important concern during the walkthroughs, and data like this can provide estimates for how
quickly UTM supervisors and RPICs need to coordinate a response to a radar failure.
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Figure 3. Plots for every instance an agent performs an action for allocation 1 (left) and
allocation 2 (right).
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Figure 4. Information exchange requirements for various work allocations
Figure 4 shows data on the total number of information exchange requirements for each
simulation run, categorized by the agents that are involved in the exchange. Every time an action
is carried out, the simulation logs what information is needed and who last updated that
information. Allocation 2 shows more information exchange requirements, particularly due to
increased requirements for human-automation information exchange. These data provide insight
into who needs to communicate with whom and how often, addressing a theme from the
walkthroughs related to communication across the various actors in the system.
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Conclusion and Future Work
We used a combination of cognitive walkthroughs and computational modeling and
simulation of edge case scenarios to analyze CM in future UTM operations. The scenario
development, cognitive walkthrough, and computational modeling occurred in an iterative
process and highlighted how insights from interviewing SMEs can be used to inform
computational modeling. The walkthroughs provide data and insights for the modeling effort,
and the computational models of work afford a thorough analysis of the system’s dynamic
response. Future work includes more detailed modeling of other classes of contingencies and
performing larger-scale analysis using the computational models. Ultimately, with extended
modeling capabilities and testing of various system architectural characteristics, the aim is to
identify specific requirements for robustness and resilience in the UTM system.
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